
























zur Zukunft der Arbeit
Institute for the Study 
of Labor 
Immigrants at New Destinations:
How They Fare and Why





Immigrants at New Destinations: 




University of Porto and CEF.UP  
 
Natércia Fortuna 
University of Porto and CEF.UP 
 
José Varejão 












P.O. Box 7240   
53072 Bonn   
Germany   
 
Phone: +49-228-3894-0  







Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in 
this series may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. 
 
The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center 
and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit 
organization supported by Deutsche Post Foundation. The center is associated with the University of 
Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and 
conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) 
original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of 
policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public.  
 
IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. 
Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be 















Immigrants at New Destinations: How They Fare and Why
* 
 
Using matched employer-employee data, we identify the determinants of immigrants’ 
earnings in the Portuguese labor market. Results previously reported for countries with a long 
tradition of hosting migrants are also valid in a new destination country. Two-thirds of the gap 
is attributable to match-specific and employer characteristics. Occupational downgrading and 
segregation into low-wage workplaces are two major causes behind the wage gap. 
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In the very heart of today’s immigration debate lies the question of how well
immigrants fare at destination. The answer to this question crucially determines
the social and economic consequences of immigration for receiving countries.
The comparison between successive cohorts of immigrants to the United States
unequivocally demonstrated the importance of skills in the process of shaping the
economic performance of immigrants both in the immediate post-migration period
and over the long-run (see Borjas, 1999, e.g.). Yet, it is also well-know that hu-
man capital accumulated at home, through schooling or labor market experience,
instantaneously looses value as individuals cross national borders. The magnitude
of this loss is signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by factors such as the economic and cultural
similarity between source and destination countries (Chiswick, 1979). The larger
those diﬀerences are the more immigrants lack country-speciﬁc skills and informa-
tion which harms their immediate labor market prospects. Alone, lower returns
to foreign human capital were found to fully explain the earnings disadvantage
of immigrants as compared to those earned by similar native workers (Friedberg,
2000). The diﬃculty of ﬁnding jobs in high-skilled occupations leads high-skilled
immigrants to accept job oﬀers in low skilled occupations, thereby magnifying the
depreciation of the human capital acquired at home.
Occupational downgrading may be optimal if combined with on-the-job search
which, with time, permits immigrants to ﬁnd better matches and receive higher
wages (Weiss et al., 2003). Mobility up the occupational ladder alongside with
rising returns to imported and local human capital are the three major sources
of wage growth for immigrants. The national origin of an individual’s human
capital (Friedberg, 2000), language skills (Chiswick and Miller, 2002), training
and experience acquired locally (Cohen and Eckstein, 2002) and clustering into
ethnic enclaves (Borjas, 2000), all have been found to play a role in the process of
economic assimilation of immigrants.
In this article we contribute to the vast literature on the economic assimilation
of immigrants at destination by focusing on a new host country and by using
matched employer-employee data instead of the more widely used employee-level
data.
Most stylized facts in the economic migration literature were derived from the
analysis of countries with a long tradition as hosts of international migrants. How-
ever, as international migration ﬂows went through major changes in recent years,
a number of new destinations emerged. In Europe, this was notably the case of
Southern countries - Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal - all of which have a long
tradition as sending nations.
In this paper we focus on the case of Portugal. We oﬀer evidence that allows
us to put immigrants economic performance in a new destination country against
the background of other countries with a longer history of inward migration. This
is the ﬁrst contribution of the article.
Throughout the article, we use matched employer-employee data. Although
we do not claim that these data are universally superior to the more widely used
employee data, we do showthat some important and previously neglected questions
are best answered with these data. Speciﬁcally, we are able to control for employer
and match characteristics in the estimation of wage equations. By using such data
we are also able to address the topic of immigrant concentration in the workplace
and thereby assess the role that factors such as discrimination and ‘ethnic goods’
1play in shaping the earnings of immigrants.1 This is the second contribution of
the article.
The paper is outlined as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy describes the evolution of
immigration to Portugal in recent years. Section 3 presents the dataset. In section
4 an estimate of the wage disadvantage of immigrants is obtained and its variation
over the entire distribution of wages is analyzed - the importance of minimum wage
legislation at the left-tail of the distribution is illustrated. In section 5 we look at
the eﬀect of the concentration of immigrants at the workplace on their earnings.
Section 6 concludes.
2 The Immigration Record
Portugal’s position in the context of international migrations changed dramatically
in the late 1990s as was also the case with other Southern European countries (see
Venturini, 2004). Portuguese nationals have been leaving the country predom-
inantly for work-related reasons at least since the mid-eighteenth century ﬁrst
towards the Americas (specially Brazil) and after World War II towards Conti-
nental Europe, specially France and Germany. As a result of this sustained ﬂow
of migration over such a long period of time, it is estimated that as many as 4
million Portuguese citizens (about 40 percent of the total population residing in
the country) currently lives abroad.
However, the economic recession in Europe in the early 1970s and the change
of political regime in 1974 in Portugal combined to originate a reduction in out-
migration. It was also during these years that Portugal had its ﬁrst experience as
a region of inward migration following the independence of the country’s former
colonies in Africa (see Carrington and Lima, 1996).
Ever since that time, the number of foreign nationals living in Portugal increased
steadily (see Figure 1). Net immigration became positive in 1993, and there has
been a large increase in the number of immigrants arriving in Portugal since the
end of the twentieth century which was also accompanied by a change in the
composition of the ﬂow of immigrants.
The changes we observed in Portugal are part of a larger process of recompo-
sition of migration ﬂows worldwide. As the proportion of European immigrants
increased during the 1990s following the opening of the Eastern European borders,
the same happened in Portugal where immigrants arriving from Portuguese speak-
ing nations (in Africa or from Brazil) were out-numbered by those arriving from
such countries as Ukraine and Moldova. Other countries in Asia (China, India and
Pakistan) also contributed with a growing number of immigrants. However, im-
migrants arriving in Portugal diﬀer from those choosing to migrate to other more
developed countries in the OECD area because they are younger and they have
lower levels of education even comparing to natives. They are also predominantly
migrants for employment-related reasons. Asylum-seekers and refugees as well as
immigrants entering through family reuniﬁcation programs are less numerous here
than elsewhere (see SOPEMI, 2002, p.21). Although such migration patterns are
not common in most OECD countries, they are also noticed in other Southern
European countries where it is also the case that cultural and linguistic aﬃnity
1These data are not without problems. The most severe is perhaps the lack of information on the family status
of the worker. Although the results obtained are in the same ballpark as indicated by other studies that use
employee data.
2Figure 1:                                                 (1981 2006)         : SEF


















































































































between sending and receiving regions is weaker for more recent immigration co-
horts.
3 The Data
The data set used in this study comes from Quadros de Pessoal (QP). QP is
an annual mandatory employment survey collected by the Portuguese Ministry
of Labor, that covers virtually all establishments with wage earners.2 Each year
every establishment with wage earners is legally obliged to ﬁll in a standardized
questionnaire. By law, the questionnaire is made available to every worker in a
public space of the establishment. This requirement facilitates the work of the
services of the Ministry of Labor that monitor employers compliance with the
law (e. g., illegal work). The administrative nature of the data and its public
availability imply a high degree of coverage and reliability.
Reported data cover the establishment itself (location, economic activity and
employment), the ﬁrm (location, economic activity, employment, sales and legal
framework) and each of its workers (gender, age, education, skill, occupation,
tenure, earnings and duration of work). The information on earnings is very com-
plete. It includes the base wage (gross pay for normal hours of work), regular and
irregular wage beneﬁts and overtime pay. Information on normal and overtime
hours of work is also available. In fact, one of the main advantages of this data
2In general, public administration and non-market services are excluded.
3set is to have information at both individual and ﬁrm levels and to match workers
with their employers.
Even though the Ministry of Labor has been conducting this survey since 1982,
the 2000 wave is the ﬁrst to have information on the worker’s nationality.3 Data
to this study were available until the year 2004 with the exception of the 2001
wave. Because all information is reported by the employer there is no information
in the data about the timing of foreign workers entry to the country. However, the
ﬁrst time an individual enters paid employment (legally) he or she also enters the
database. At that moment they are given an identiﬁcation number that is unique
and remains constant over time. We made use of this property of the data to
identify as accurately as possible the timing of entry into (formal) employment of
each immigrant worker. To do that we constructed a panel of employees starting
in 1991 and traced each non-national worker present in the data at least once in
2003 and 2004 back to its ﬁrst record. We take the year of that worker-speciﬁc
ﬁrst record as a proxy to the immigrant’s time of entry to the country and start
counting the length of stay in the country at that moment (duration is censored at
13 years). By proceeding this way we aim at minimizing the impact of the absence
of direct information on the time of arrival to the country.
We restrict our sample to non-apatrid workers aged between 16 and 64 years.
Because we use ﬁrst lagged variables in regression analysis and the 2001 wave of
the data is not available we only use observations drawn from the 2003 and 2004
waves. After excluding all observations with missing values on the explanatory
variables used in regression analysis and the outliers in wages (1% top and bottom
observations), we obtained a sample that contains a total of 3.8 million obser-
vations (years×individuals), approximately 1.9 million per year, corresponding to
1,414,244 male workers and to 1,039,514 female workers.4
Of the total number of records, 156,224 correspond to non-Portuguese citizens
and are therefore classiﬁed as immigrants. Consistent with the evolution of the
number of foreign citizens residing in the country, the number of immigrants in
the dataset also increases from 71,818 in 2003 to 84,406 in 2004. Sample means for
the two groups of workers (native-borns and immigrants), as well as for selected
groups of nationalities are presented separately for men and women in Tables A.1
and A.2 of Appendix A.
Foreign workers account for 4.1 percent of total employment in the private
sector of the economy. The corresponding ﬁgures for men and women are 4.8
percent and 3.2 percent, respectively. Employed immigrants fromthe former Soviet
Union nations are the most numerous group. They account for 38.1 percent of all
immigrants in the country (43.6 percent if we consider male immigrants only).
They are followed at some distance by immigrants from the former Portuguese
colonies in Africa (which were traditionally dominant and now account for as
much as 25 percent of the total) and from Brazil (17.6 percent of the total).
EU14-nationals (i.e. citizens of the EU15 excluding Portugal) represent a small
minority of all foreigners working in Portugal (6.2 percent).5
3The nationality of the worker is the only information available that helps to identify migrant workers. For
that reason, throughout the article, we take the word immigrant as synonimous of non-national citizen. This is
not our preferred option. However, given the fact that large inﬂows of migrants are new to Portugal we believe
that this is not an unsurmountable obstacle.
4Whenever a worker was present in one wave of the QP dataset more than once we only kept the register
corresponding to the establishment where he or she was working more hours.
5For a description of the composition of each nationality group, see notes to Tables A.1 and A.2 in Appendix
4Comparing male immigrants and male native workers we ﬁnd that the average
age of immigrants (35.4) is less than it is for natives (36.4). Immigrants are less
educated and they are allocated to positions closer to the bottom-end of the skills
distribution.6 Tenure of immigrant male workers is 1.9 years, 5.9 years below the
natives’ average. This reﬂects the recent nature of immigration to Portugal as well
as immigrants’ weaker attachment to employment. Tenure is specially short for
immigrants arriving from Brazil (1.3 years).
The unconditional average of immigrants’ hourly wage is less than the natives
average for all nationality groups except the EU14. The lowest average wages are
recorded for the group of the former USSR nationals (0.95 and 0.89 Euros per
hour (in logs) for men and women, respectively) and for the Chinese (0.79 and
0.77 Euros per hour (in logs) for men and women, respectively). About 10 percent
of all male immigrants (24.6 percent in the case of women) receive the minimum
wage.
The sectoral distribution of immigrant employment diﬀers markedly between
men and women. Male immigrants are predominantly employed in the construction
industry (39.2 percent) and in manufacturing (18.7 percent). Female immigrants
concentrate in wholesale, retail trade &
hotels sectors (39.0 percent), and in banking, insurance and services to ﬁrms
(28.5 percent) which includes temporary help agencies and cleaning services.
4 The magnitude of the immigrant wage gap
The standard approach to the study of the earnings of immigrants is based on
the estimation of a human capital earnings function (Mincer, 1974) augmented to
include immigrants experience in the host labor market (Chiswick, 1978). Typ-
ically, studies that proceed along these lines use data from national labor force
surveys or censuses of population. For that reason, the wage functions that under-
lie such studies are standard Mincerian equations that are occasionally augmented
to include (whenever available) some measure of the destination language ﬂuency,
minority language concentration in residential areas and indicators of the country
of origin of the immigrant (e.g., Chiswick and Miller, 2002).
The type of data available for the study of immigrants’ earnings does not al-
low us to control for the characteristics of the workplace which are known to be
important determinants of earnings. However, being able to control for such char-
acteristics is essential for decomposing the earnings gap into its two components:
wage discrimination and segregation across establishments and occupations.
In this section we report the results of the estimation of wage equations for the
entire population of wage-earners in the Portuguese private sector for the 2003-
04 period (Table 1). We start with a parsimonious speciﬁcation (speciﬁcation 1)
that controls only for the demographic characteristics of workers (age, nationality
status, the proxy for time since arrival to the country, and the region of work),
education and time-eﬀects.7 Although we are not able to control for some char-
acteristics that are included in most available studies (specially, family status) we
A.
6Each worker is administratively assigned to one skill level out of eight possible: Highly Professional, Pro-
fessional, Supervisor, Highly-skilled, Skilled, Semi-skilled, Unskilled and Apprentices. Assignment is determined
exclusively on the basis of the workers’ occupation and educational level.
7For a deﬁnition of the variables see Appendix B.
5view this speciﬁcation as the equivalent to the ones most widely used in previous
research.
Our interest is in the estimates of the coeﬃcients of three covariates: one dummy
variable - IMIG - indicating nationality status (equal to one if the worker is a non-
national citizen), one variable measuring the number of years since the worker
ﬁrst entered the database (years since migration) taken as a proxy for experience
accumulated in the Portuguese labor market - YSM - and one variable capturing
the concentration of immigrants at the workplace as measured by the proportion
of all workers in the establishment that are non-national citizens - LPIMIGE.8 All
equations were estimated separately for men and women.
The results in the second column of Table 1 point to male immigrants’ earn-
ings being at the time of entry approximately 31.6 percent below the earnings of
similar natives.9 Although on the high-side, this result is in line with previous es-
timates reported for the relative wage of immigrants in other countries such as the
U.S., Canada or Israel. The corresponding ﬁgure for female immigrants is −19.8
percent.
Table 1: Pooled OLS wage regression (selected estimates), 2003-04
Dependent variable: log of real hourly wage
OLS
Speciﬁcation 1 Speciﬁcation 2 Speciﬁcation 3
Male sample
IMIG -0.31671* -0.24523* -0.11094*
(0.00194) (0.00203) (0.00173)




N 2175308 2175308 2175308
R-sq 0.4312 0.4762 0.5829
Female sample
IMIG -0.19833* -0.14613* -0.06200*
(0.00252) (0.00261) (0.00216)




N 1635960 1635960 1635960
R-sq 0.5131 0.5464 0.6357
Notes: (i) robust cluster standard errors in parentheses;
(ii) *, **, *** denotes signiﬁcant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
8We measure immigrant concentration as the share of workers in the establishment that are non-national
citizens. To minimize potential endogeneity problems we use the ﬁrst lag of this variable measured at the es-
tablishment level, meaning that for worker i in establishment j in year t the immigrant concentration variable
measures the proportion of immigrant workers in establishment j in year t − 1 even if worker i was working at a
diﬀerent establishment in year t − 1 or he or she had not entered the country at that time.
9In Table 1 we only report the estimates for the coeﬃcients of interest. The full set of results is reported in
Tables C.1 and C.2 in Appendix C, for men and women, respectively.
6Approximately one quarter of the immigrants’ earnings gap disappears if we
control for such employer characteristics as size, industry and workplace concen-
tration of non-national workers (speciﬁcation 2). Put diﬀerently, one quarter of
the conditional wage diﬀerence between native and non-native workers can be at-
tributed to the characteristics of the workplace such as industry, establishment
size and immigrant concentration.
If we include in the set of regressors, as we do in speciﬁcation 3, controls for
match-speciﬁc characteristics such as tenure and skill categories, the earnings gap
of immigrants at the time of entry to the Portuguese labor market is reduced to
-11.1 and -6.2 percent for male and female workers,
respectively, which is the equivalent to one third of the corresponding estimate
obtained with speciﬁcation 1. This result indicates that the diﬀerence upon arrival
in the earnings of immigrants and natives with similar personal characteristics is
for the most part due to the characteristics of the matches they form, immigrants
being penalized on two diﬀerent counts: absence of match-speciﬁc human capital
(as they have just entered the country) and occupational downgrading. The sen-
sitivity of the estimate of the coeﬃcient of the immigrant status variable to the
inclusion of the occupational dummies indicates that immigrants work at lower
levels of the occupational-ladder than similar natives working for similar employ-
ers. Considering that high-skilled immigration is a recent phenomenon in Portugal,
this is consistent with Eckstein and Weiss (2004) who note that, upon entry, immi-
grants from the former Soviet Union to Israel experience substantial occupational
downgrading - half of the male immigrants with more than 16 years of schooling
work in low-skill occupations during the ﬁrst three years in Israel. Green (1999)
also reports substantial occupational mobility (away from nonemployment and less
skilled occupations) of immigrants during their ﬁrst years of stay in Canada.
The estimate of the coeﬃcient of the variable that measures the immigrants’
length of stay in Portugal also indicates that the wage progress of immigrants is
accounted for by both within-job and between jobs mobility. For men, our baseline
estimate indicates that immigrants wages grow above similar natives’ wages at 2.4
p. p. per year spent in the host country. However, this estimate drops oﬀ to
1.2 p.p. when controls for match-speciﬁc characteristics (including occupational
categories) are considered.
The penalty on the wages of immigrants is not constant over the wage distri-
bution. The results obtained by estimating quantile wage regressions (Koencker,
2005) adopting the same speciﬁcation as speciﬁcation 3 in Table 1 indicate that
the wage penalty received by male immigrants increases steadily over the entire
distribution of wages, from a minimum of 0.07 at the ﬁrst decile to a maximum of
0.13 at the ninth decile - Figure 2.10 For women, the pattern is similar although
with a diﬀerence at percentile 9.
The fact that immigrants do relatively better at the lower-end of the wage
distribution may be the consequence of mandatory minimum wage rules that have
been in place in Portugal since as early as 1974 and that are actually binding both
in terms of wages and employment opportunities (Portugal and Cardoso, 2006,
10Throughout the paper we refer to the immigrants’ wage penalty as the absolute value of the coeﬃcient of the
immigrant status dummy variable in the wage equation.
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Pereira, 2003). If we look at the wages immigrants are paid in the Portuguese
labor market we ﬁnd that 10.4 percent of the males and 24.6 percent of the females
receive the legal minimum (for natives the corresponding ﬁgures are 5.5 percent
and 12.9 percent), respectively (see Tables A.1 and A.2 in Appendix A).
Results in Table 1 also show that the concentration of immigrants at the es-
tablishment has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on wages. From speciﬁcation 3 the estimated
eﬀect of a one percentage point increase in the proportion of the establishment’s
workforce who are non-nationals reduces wages by 0.17 percent for both male and
female workers. Still, the magnitude of this eﬀect also varies considerably across
the wage distribution - it is minimum at the ﬁrst decile and increases until we
reach the seventh deciles for both men and women (Figure 3).
5 Workplace concentration of immigrants and wages
There are two reasons why a greater presence of immigrants in the workplace may
bring about a reduction in wages. The ﬁrst is a standard compensating wage
diﬀerential reason. Immigrant workers may be willing to pay to work with other
immigrants. To the extent that these co-workers have the same national origin or
cultural background several factors can explain why immigrants would be willing
to accept lower wages to work in such environments, ranging from (workplace)
ethnic goods (common language, working habits, etc) to search economies or herd
behavior.












































However, the same result is also consistent with a discrimination-crowding ex-
planation. According to this explanation immigrants earn lower wages because
they work in speciﬁc occupations and/or for speciﬁc employers. Segregation oc-
curs for several reasons. Discriminatory behavior by employers is one of them.
But statistical discrimination or discriminatory behavior by fellow employees are
equally admissible causes of the same fact. Statistical discrimination in particular
is consistent with a number of stylized facts in the literature on the economic as-
similation of immigrants, most notably the fact that immigrants’ entry into host
labor markets is made more diﬃcult when the cultural distance between home
and host countries is greater and the fact that the imperfect portability of human
capital across countries reduces wages immediately upon arrival in the country
with some part of the gap being closed after a few years of the stay. Note that
the statistical discrimination hypothesis crucially depends on the assumption that
employers’ ability to screen workers varies across groups (cultural distance making
the assumption more reasonable) and it implies that the greatest impact of this
type of discrimination is on entry-level wages.
Admittedly the results we obtained in the previous section do not allow us
to disentangle the two sets of arguments. To do that we re-estimated the wage
equation corresponding to speciﬁcation 3 in Table 1, separately for immigrants and
natives (men and women). The estimates we obtained for the coeﬃcient of the
workplace immigrant concentration variable (LPIMIGE) are reported on Table
2.11
11Full results are presented in Table D of Appendix D.
9Table 2: Pooled OLS wage regression (selected estimates), 2003-04












Notes: (i) robust cluster standard errors in parentheses;
(ii) *, **, *** denotes signiﬁcant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
The ﬁrst thing to notice from Table 2 is that the estimated coeﬃcient of the
LPIMIGE in the immigrants’ wage equation is indeed negative and signiﬁcant.
The estimated wage of male immigrant workers drops oﬀ 0.14 percent for each
percentage point increase in the share of non-national workers in the establishment.
The corresponding ﬁgure for female immigrants is -0.07 percent. As explained,
this result is not suﬃcient to tell whether this is due to the compensating wage
diﬀerential mechanism or if it has a discrimination interpretation.
However, as seen fromthe second column of Table 2, the estimated coeﬃcient for
the same variable in the native workers equation - male or female - is also negative
and statistically signiﬁcant. This result rules out the compensating diﬀerential
interpretation as there is no reason why native workers would be willing to accept
substantial wage reductions to work with non-native fellow workers.12
These results are not consistent with the compensating wage diﬀerential story
as both immigrants and natives’ pay diminish with the share of immigrants at
the workplace. Besides, compensating wage diﬀerentials are equilibrium outcomes
that are less likely in a labor market where large-scale immigration is a recent
phenomenon. On the contrary, discrimination-driven wage diﬀerentials are a dis-
equilibrium outcome and because of that they are more likely in situations such
as that of the Portuguese labor market. Results in Table 2 rule out employee
discrimination as this would imply a positive (not negative) sign for the coeﬃcient
of the immigrant concentration variable in the native wage equation. The results
we obtained indicate that the reason immigrants receive lower wages than other-
wise similar native workers is because they are working for diﬀerent employers,
12Nepotism could arguably have produced the same eﬀect but the estimated coeﬃcients are far too large to
believe that this is the case. In any case, nepotistic behavior is less common among low-wage workers. This type
of behavior is more frequently referred to amongst high-skilled white-collar workers in intellectual or scientiﬁc
occupations (although not in the context of wage studies). The results of quantile regression estimation (Figure
3) indicate otherwise - the magnitude of the eﬀect of workplace concentration for the pooled sample of natives
and immigrants increases as we move to the right of the wage distribution.
10employers that pay lower wages to all their workers, natives or not.13 Therefore,
we conclude that the wage penalty immigrants receive is the immediate result of
their being segregated into the low pay sector of the economy due to employer
discrimination. From our results alone, we cannot tell whether such discrimina-
tory behavior is grounded in statistical discrimination type of arguments (which
could be explained by the fact that the latest and largest cohorts of immigrants are
arriving from more diversiﬁed origins than previously) or whether it is the result
of pure prejudice against non-native workers (an explanation that cannot be ruled
out considering that this is a recent phenomenon and for that reason consistent
with disequilibrium outcomes).
Two further pieces of evidence can be put forward in support of the same inter-
pretation. The ﬁrst are the results obtained for the same speciﬁcation of the wage
equation when we control for nationality groups. The compensating wage diﬀer-
ential explanation is more likely (and the employer discrimination explanation less
likely) when the group of immigrants belong to a group with a similar cultural
background. Native language being the single most important factor determining
the proximity between origin and destination, we would expect that workers orig-
inating from the Portuguese former colonies in Africa (including East Timorese in
this group) and from Brazil to be the least prone to look for being close to other
immigrants and for that reason to accept lower wages to work with their similars.
This is not what we observe.
The distribution of immigrants originating from the Portuguese former colonies
in Africa, East Timor and Brazil across workplaces with varying levels of immi-
grant concentration does not diﬀer markedly from the distribution of the entire
population of immigrants working in Portuguese territory (Figure 4 and Tables A.1
and A.2 in Appendix A). There are, however, some diﬀerences between the two
groups considered. African immigrants seem to concentrate in more immigrant-
populated workplaces than Brazilian immigrants. This is valid for both men and
women. The average proportion of immigrants in workplaces where African men
are working is 42.9 percent, 4 p. p. above the corresponding ﬁgure for the entire
group of male immigrants (38.9 percent). In contrast for Brazilian males, the av-
erage proportion of immigrants in the workplaces where they are employed is 35.2
percent.14
By looking at the distribution of the share of immigrants at the workplace for
these two groups it becomes apparent that the observed diﬀerences in the means are
due to diﬀerences in the tails of the two distributions - a greater share of Brazilians
work in establishments where foreign workers account for less than 10 percent of
the total and a smaller share of them work in establishments where immigrants
represent more than 90 percent of the total number of employees. This pattern,
13The establishment ﬁxed eﬀects results presented in Appendix C corroborate this idea. Actually, when an
establishment ﬁxed eﬀect is added to speciﬁcation 3, the immigrant wage penalty is reduced by around 3 p. p. for
both men and women. Notice also that the estimates for the coeﬃcient of the workplace immigrant concentration
variable (LPIMIGE) are substantially reduced. Nevertheless, we cannot interpret this result as indicating a strong
correlation between this variable and establishment unobserved characteristics, because the impact of LPIMIGE is
identiﬁed only for those establishments that experienced a variation in workplace concentration over the two-year
period and this corresponds to a small proportion of our sample.
14For women, the average share of immigrants in the workplace is 35.0 percent, 33.1 for the Africa & East
Timor group and 33.9 percent for the Brazilian group.
11Figure 4: D               LPIMIGE                           &  .         ,    




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































12which is common to the male and female distributions, is totally reversed when
we consider immigrants originating in Africa & East Timor.
Although the distribution of Brazilian and African immigrants across work-
places is not similar (closer to what is warranted by cultural proximity in the case
of Brazilians), we do not ﬁnd any evidence of either group being willing to pay less
to work with other immigrants as it would be implied by most existing studies on
ethnic segregation and cultural proximity.
Running the same wage regressions as in Table 2 but including dummy variables
for nationality groups and interaction terms between the latter and immigrant
concentration (the omitted category is UE14) we ﬁnd, in the case of men, that
the two Portuguese-speaking groups are the ones for which we observe a greater
reduction in wages when the share of immigrants at the workplace increases (Table
3). For women this is also true although the interaction terms coeﬃcients are not
statistically signiﬁcant at the conventional levels.
Table 3: Pooled OLS wage regression (selected estimates), 2003-04




Former USSR -0.2948* -0.2097*
(0.0107) (0.0109)






Other Nationalities -0.2413* -0.1496*
(0.0114) (0.0127)
LPIMIGE×Former USSR 0.1749* 0.0203
(0.0295) (0.0275)










Notes: (i) robust cluster standard errors in parentheses;
(ii) *, **, *** denotes signiﬁcant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
There is information contained in the pattern of variation over the wage distri-
bution of the estimated coeﬃcient of the LPIMIGE if quantile wage regressions
are estimated separately for each nationality group. The results concerning the
13Figure 5: E                        LPIMIGE   Q                                  








































UE14 Former USSR Africa & E. Timor
Brazil China Other
variable of interest are plotted in Figure 5 where a dashed line means that the
corresponding estimate is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 10 percent
level of signiﬁcance (all the other estimates are signiﬁcant at 1 percent).15
Only two nationality groups escape the dominant pattern of variation of the
estimate for the LPIMIGE variable that was depicted in Figure 3. One - the
Chinese group - is virtually constant and equal to zero up to the seventh decile.
However, in this case the small size (1,377 observations) of the underlying sample
clouds the interpretation of this result. The other group is the group of the EU14
national citizens. For these individuals, the wage penalty for each percentage point
increase in the share of immigrants in the workplace varies between six and nine
percent in the bottom half of the distribution and becomes null at the top-half.
From a sociological point of view this pattern is consistent with a compensating
diﬀerential interpretation, although it does not rule out competing interpretations.
It ﬂows from existing theories of socio-behavioural processes that in a society where
members are ranked according to a quantitative characteristic such as income and
which has two (or more) subgroups based on nationality or ethnicity for example,
the bottom subgroup is less devoted to its own subgroup than the top subgroup (see
Jasso, 2008). Hence, you would expect that as we approach the top-end of the wage
distribution individuals would become less willing to pay to work with members
of the same sub-group. Figure 5 shows that to all, but for the two nationality
groups mentioned above, this is not the case. For these other nationality groups
(and specially for immigrants originating from Portuguese former colonies) the
wage penalty associated with working with other immigrant increases over the
wage distribution. This is yet another piece of evidence that works against the
15We only report the results for male samples.
14compensating diﬀerential interpretation of our result.
6 Conclusion
Portugal’s history as destination country for international migrants is recent. How-
ever, similar to other countries with long immigration records, it is also the case
here that immigrants are paid below the wage of similar native workers, the dif-
ference being similar to what has been found in previous studies for those other
nations.
Notwithstanding, our results also show that the magnitude of the gap is very
sensitive to the inclusion of controls for job and match characteristics. This re-
sult indicates that, upon arrival, earnings diﬀerences between migrants and non-
migrants are mostly due to the characteristics of the match they form, occupational
downgrading playing a major role.
One interesting feature of matched employer-employee data is that they allow
us to know how immigrants are sorted across workplaces. Similar to what we
know about residential concentration, we found that immigrants are also highly
concentrated in a relatively small number of establishments.
Immigrants’ wages diminish as the share of non-native workers at the workplace
increases. Although this result could have a conventional compensating wage dif-
ferential interpretation, several facts indicate otherwise. First, it is also the case
that natives’ wages diminish when the number of their non-native co-workers in-
crease. Second, immigrants who share with natives the same native language (i.e.,
Brazilians and immigrants from the former Portuguese colonies in Africa), make
choices concerning working with natives or non-natives that are no diﬀerent from
those made by other groups of immigrants. Third, if anything, the wage penalty
due to work with more non-natives is higher for these two groups than for most
other groups considered. Fourth, the negative eﬀect of immigrant concentration on
immigrants’ wages is higher at the top of the wage distribution for all nationalities
but the Western Europeans (i.e., those originating in the EU14 group of nations).
We conclude that immigrants segregation into low-wage workplaces is the main
reason behind the negative association between their wages and the number of
immigrants they work with.
15APPENDIX A - Descriptive Statistics
Table A.1: Sample means 2003-04 - Men
Groups of Immigrants
Former Africa &
Variables Natives Immig. EU14 USSR E.Timor Brazil China Others
Age (in years) 36.4 35.4 36.7 36.6 36.0 32.3 34.3 33.8
Years since migration (%)
≤ 5 86.3 58.8 93.5 68.8 93.5 91.2 90.8
> 5 and ≤ 10 6.1 21.6 1.8 15.4 2.8 6.7 4.3
> 10 7.6 19.6 4.7 15.8 3.6 4.9 2.1
Tenure (in years) 7.8 1.9 3.9 1.8 2.5 1.3 1.5 1.5
Education Levels (%)
Less than 6 years 31.1 31.7 9.7 30.8 44.1 23.6 31.6 48.9
6 years completed 24.3 16.5 11.2 16.6 15.5 19.4 16.4 9.7
9 years completed 20.5 19.4 19.6 20.4 16.0 22.1 18.3 15.0
12 years completed 16.2 16.1 25.8 15.2 11.8 20.8 17.4 4.8
College education 7.6 4.9 26.7 3.7 3.4 3.5 4.8 1.6
Non-deﬁned 0.3 11.5 6.8 13.2 9.2 10.5 11.6 20.0
Qualiﬁcation Levels (%)
Highly Professional 5.5 2.0 17.2 0.5 1.5 1.9 1.8 2.8
Professional 4.5 1.5 13.2 0.5 1.4 1.1 1.5 1.3
Supervisors 5.5 1.4 7.8 0.6 1.6 1.4 0.4 1.3
Highly Skilled and Skilled 56.3 43.0 43.1 38.8 50.8 46.5 39.7 40.2
Semi-skilled and Unskilled 21.0 39.7 12.7 47.3 32.8 34.5 39.4 42.0
Apprentices 4.1 5.8 3.0 7.1 2.7 7.3 15.4 4.9
Non-deﬁned 3.2 6.7 3.9 5.1 9.2 7.4 0.8 8.5
Industry (%)
Agriculture & ﬁshing 1.6 2.8 3.0 4.0 0.4 1.4 0.6 4.6
Mining & quarrying 0.8 0.8 0.8 1.3 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.4
Manufacturing 30.0 18.7 24.0 26.8 8.8 13.4 0.9 13.6
Electricity, gas & water 1.0 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0
Construction 18.9 39.2 10.0 40.7 51.8 31.2 0.8 39.4
Wholesale, retail trade & hotels 23.6 17.3 28.8 11.5 12.5 28.5 96.4 17.5
Transport, storage & communications 8.4 4.9 6.8 5.9 3.0 5.5 0.1 3.6
Banking, insurance & services to ﬁrms 11.2 13.5 14.0 8.3 20.4 16.3 0.4 17.6
Community, social & personal services 4.3 2.8 12.4 1.5 2.7 3.3 0.7 3.4
Plant Size (in logs) 3.51 3.56 3.79 3.43 3.90 3.42 3.69 1.53
Concentration of Immigrants (%) 3.1 38.9 25.7 36.6 42.9 35.2 44.8 89.1
Real Hourly Wage (in logs) 1.29 1.01 1.63 0.95 1.02 1.02 0.79 0.99
Minimum Wage Earners (%) 5.5 10.4 5.2 10.1 9.3 10.1 11.2 47.7
Number of Observations 2,071,710 103,598 5,102 45,215 21,502 17,296 1,377 13,106
Notes: (i) Real hourly wages in log EURO;
(ii) EU14: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Luxemburg, The Netherlands, Spain,
Sweden and United Kingdom; Former USSR: Russia, Ukraine, Moldova and other former USSR nations;
Africa & E.Timor: Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, São Tomé & Príncipe, and East-Timor.
16Table A.2: Sample means 2003-04 - Women
Groups of Immigrants
Former Africa &
Variables Natives Immig. EU14 USSR E.Timor Brazil China Others
Age (in years) 36.5 34.7 34.2 35.9 35.6 32.1 33.4 32.9
Years since migration (%)
≤ 5 79.2 64.5 85.4 68.7 93.4 90.4 85.1
> 5 and ≤ 10 10.6 18.3 4.9 17.4 3.4 7.5 8.3
> 10 10.2 17.2 9.7 13.9 3.1 2.2 6.6
Tenure (in years) 7.1 2.3 3.5 2.4 2.4 1.4 1.8 2.2
Education Levels (%)
Less than 6 years 26.4 31.5 9.7 27.9 49.2 17.1 47.7 22.3
6 years completed 21.7 13.8 8.1 14.5 13.6 16.3 11.7 13.0
9 years completed 19.1 18.6 19.6 19.7 16.4 22.2 13.8 19.1
12 years completed 21.4 16.1 20.0 18.5 12.7 30.6 3.8 26.2
College education 11.1 4.9 8.0 6.7 3.5 6.6 1.8 10.4
Non-deﬁned 0.2 8.0 6.8 12.6 4.5 7.3 21.3 9.0
Qualiﬁcation Levels (%)
Highly Professional 4.4 2.3 10.3 1.1 1.4 1.7 2.3 3.0
Professional 3.9 2.4 15.0 0.9 1.0 1.6 1.8 2.5
Supervisors 2.4 0.9 4.2 0.5 0.5 0.8 0.4 1.1
Highly Skilled and Skilled 45.0 26.2 43.1 22.5 17.4 35.6 56.4 31.2
Semi-skilled and Unskilled 36.5 56.3 17.5 61.6 70.7 43.9 28.5 50.2
Apprentices 5.6 8.1 5.0 10.5 4.8 11.6 10.3 9.3
Non-deﬁned 2.2 3.8 2.8 3.4 4.2 4.8 0.4 2.7
Industry (%)
Agriculture & ﬁshing 1.3 2.2 1.6 4.8 0.6 0.9 0.3 5.5
Mining & quarrying 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2
Manufacturing 31.6 13.9 17.1 27.7 5.6 9.5 0.5 13.8
Electricity, gas & water 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2
Construction 2.3 1.9 3.0 2.5 1.1 1.8 0.3 2.4
Wholesale, retail trade & hotels 29.6 39.0 30.8 38.5 29.4 54.9 97.3 44.1
Transport, storage & communications 3.1 1.4 5.1 0.6 1.3 1.1 0.1 1.6
Banking, insurance & services to ﬁrms 13.5 28.5 13.0 16.5 50.4 18.5 0.3 16.3
Community, social & personal services 18.2 13.0 29.2 9.1 11.6 13.3 1.2 16.0
Plant Size (in logs) 3.49 3.78 3.76 3.43 4.59 3.20 1.45 3.34
Concentration of Immigrants (%) 2.7 35.0 28.7 38.9 33.1 33.9 89.6 30.2
Real Hourly Wage (in logs) 1.13 0.98 1.47 0.89 0.94 0.94 0.77 1.13
Minimum Wage Earners (%) 12.9 24.6 8.0 22.0 32.7 20.0 57.9 19.5
Number of Observations 1,583,334 52,626 4,558 14,354 18,891 10,191 738 3,894
Notes: (i) Real hourly wages in log EURO;
(ii) EU14: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Luxemburg, The Netherlands, Spain,
Sweden and United Kingdom; Former USSR: Russia, Ukraine, Moldova and other former USSR nations;
Africa & E.Timor: Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, São Tomé & Príncipe, and East-Timor.
17APPENDIX B - Variables Deﬁnition
IMIG = 1 if immigrant;
AGE: age (in years);
AGESQ: age squared (in years);
YSM: number of years since migration;
YSMSQ: YSM squared;
EDUCATION LEVELS
  COLLEGE EDUCATION =1;
  12 YEARS COMPLETED =1;
  9 YEARS COMPLETED =1;
  6 YEARS COMPLETED =1;
  LESS THAN 6 YEARS =1 (the omitted category);
  NON-DEFINED = 1 (residual category).
TENURE: number of years with the current employer;
TENURESQ: tenure squared;
QUALIFICATION LEVELS
  HIGHLY PROFESSIONAL =1;
  PROFESSIONAL =1;
  SUPERVISORS =1;
  HIGHLY SKILLED AND SKILLED =1;
  SEMI-SKILLED AND UNSKILLED =1;
  APPRENTICES =1 (the omitted category);
  NON-DEFINED = 1 (residual category).
LPIMIGE: proportion of non-natives workers in the establishment (lagged by one year);
LSIZE: number of employees in the establishment (in logs).
REGIONAL DUMMIES: are deﬁned at the level of NUTS III;
INDUSTRY DUMMIES: are deﬁned at the one-digit level according to the Portuguese Clas-
siﬁcation of Economic Activities (CAE);
REAL HOURLY WAGE: the ratio between the real monthly base wage and the total number
of hours usually worked (in log EURO; base=2002).
18APPENDIX C - Full OLS and FE Results
Table C.1: Wage regression - Male sample, 2003-04
Dependent variable: log of real hourly wage
OLS Establishment
Speciﬁcation 1 Speciﬁcation 2 Speciﬁcation 3 FE
IMIG -0.31671* -0.24523* -0.11094* -0.07837*
(0.00194) (0.00203) (0.00173) (0.00130)
YSM 0.02411* 0.02336* 0.01204* 0.00572*
(0.00078) (0.00075) (0.00066) (0.00040)
YSMSQ -0.00047* -0.00045* -0.00029* -0.00016*
(0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00002)
LPIMIGE -0.20541* -0.16965* -0.00370
(0.00253) (0.00221) (0.00424)
AGE 0.04953* 0.04715* 0.02604* 0.02143*
(0.00019) (0.00019) (0.00018) (0.00012)
AGESQ -0.00044* -0.00043* -0.00026* -0.00020*
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00003) (0.00000)
EDUCATION LEVELS
6 years completed 0.12681* 0.11345* 0.08335* 0.06271*
(0.00081) (0.00078) (0.00069) (0.00053)
9 years completed 0.25562* 0.22221* 0.16659* 0.10801*
(0.00098) (0.00095) (0.00083) (0.00059)
12 years completed 0.44956* 0.40052* 0.29307* 0.16303*
(0.00117) (0.00116) (0.00104) (0.00067)
College education 0.96921* 0.90261* 0.58580* 0.37645*
(0.00166) (0.00164) (0.00185) (0.00098)
Non-deﬁned 0.10650* 0.13155* 0.10543* 0.08010*
(0.00315) (0.00296) (0.00254) (0.00241)













Highly-skilled and skilled 0.18056* 0.18468*
(0.00096) (0.00100)




CONSTANT -0.00705*** -0.10006* 0.20104* 0.44149*
(0.00366) (0.00366) (0.00326) (0.01181)
N 2175308 2175308 2175308 2175308
R-sq 0.4312 0.4762 0.5829 0.4959
Notes: (i) speciﬁcation 1 includes a set of regional and time dummies;
(ii) speciﬁcations 2 and 3 include a set of regional, industry and time dummies;
(iii) robust cluster standard errors in parentheses for the pooled OLS model;
(iv) *, **, *** denotes signiﬁcant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 19Table C.2: Wage regression - Female sample, 2003-04
Dependent variable: log of real hourly wage
OLS Establishment
Speciﬁcation 1 Speciﬁcation 2 Speciﬁcation 3 FE
IMIG -0.19833* -0.14613* -0.06200* -0.03255*
(0.00252) (0.00261) (0.00216) (0.00156)
YSM 0.01510* 0.01341* 0.00488* 0.00344*
(0.00093) (0.00063) (0.00076) (0.00045)
YSMSQ -0.00047* -0.00007 0.00004 -0.00003
(0.00003) (0.00005) (0.00004) (0.00002)
LPIMIGE -0.25157* -0.17160* -0.02344*
(0.00339) (0.00290) (0.00493)
AGE 0.03800* 0.03516* 0.01974* 0.01277*
(0.00021) (0.00020) (0.00018) (0.00013)
AGESQ -0.00033* -0.00030* -0.00018* -0.00011*
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000)
EDUCATION LEVELS
6 years completed 0.12028* 0.11958* 0.07866* 0.05694*
(0.00080) (0.00077) (0.00070) (0.00058)
9 years completed 0.27121* 0.26409* 0.18747* 0.12598*
(0.00104) (0.00101) (0.00086) (0.00066)
12 years completed 0.45725* 0.43512* 0.31982* 0.19305*
(0.00111) (0.00111) (0.00098) (0.00072)
College education 1.03339* 0.98787* 0.68234* 0.43607*
(0.00159) (0.00158) (0.00171) (0.00097)
Non-deﬁned 0.18430* 0.21807* 0.17010* 0.11677*
(0.00474) (0.00470) (0.00404) (0.00316)













Highly skilled and skilled 0.14004* 0.12870*
(0.00090) (0.00097)




CONSTANT 0.03958* -0.07646* 0.16889* 0.55714*
(0.00394) (0.00399) (0.00355) (0.01140)
N 1635960 1635960 1635960 1635960
R-sq 0.5131 0.5464 0.6357 0.4945
Notes: (i) speciﬁcation 1 includes a set of regional and time dummies;
(ii) speciﬁcations 2 and 3 include a set of regional, industry and time dummies;
(iii) robust cluster standard errors in parentheses for the pooled OLS model;
(iv) *, **, *** denotes signiﬁcant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
20APPENDIX D - Full OLS Results
Table D: Pooled OLS wage regressions (speciﬁcation 3), 2003-04
Dependent variable: log of real hourly wage
Male sample Female sample





LPIMIGE -0.14100* -0.19504* -0.07707* -0.23152*
(0.0030) (0.00302) (0.00504) (0.00360)
AGE 0.0066* 0.02738* 0.00823* 0.02042*
(0.00088) (0.00018) (0.00098) (0.00019)
AGESQ -0.00008* -0.00027* -0.00010* -0.00018*
(0.00001) (0.00000) (0.00001) (0.00000)
EDUCATION LEVELS
6 years completed 0.01011* 0.08875* 0.00665** 0.08159*
(0.00246) (0.00072) (0.00329) (0.00071)
9 years completed 0.03161* 0.17449* 0.04579* 0.19262*
(0.00255) (0.00087) (0.00334) (0.00089)
12 years completed 0.07489* 0.30516* 0.11265* 0.32661*
(0.00318) (0.00108) (0.00391) (0.00101)
College education 0.30326* 0.59848* 0.42048* 0.68927*
(0.00941) (0.00189) (0.01106) (0.00173)
Non-deﬁned 0.02619* 0.08100* 0.06381* 0.15283*
(0.00321) (0.00407) (0.00610) (0.00491)
LSIZE 0.02615 0.04517* 0.02530* 0.03770*
(0.00077) (0.00018) (0.00102) (0.00018)
TENURE 0.02222 0.01677 0.01927* 0.01602*
(0.00120) (0.00010) (0.00132) (0.00011)
TENURESQ -0.00058 -0.00027 -0.00032* -0.00025*
(0.00006) (0.00000) (0.00007) (0.00000)
QUALIFICATION LEVELS
Highly professional 0.9136 0.58671 0.78975* 0.53542*
(0.01603) (0.00225) (0.01958) (0.00241)
Professional 0.76888 0.55063 0.67215* 0.49317*
(0.01635) (0.00209) (0.01690) (0.00238)
Supervisors 0.54884 0.40254 0.48205* 0.35461*
(0.01636) (0.00169) (0.02554) (0.00233)
Highly skilled and skilled 0.18316 0.17718 0.17179* 0.13742*
(0.00326) (0.00100) (0.00430) (0.00092)
Semi-skilled and unskilled 0.03521 0.00360 0.02282* 0.00211**
(0.00301) (0.00101) (0.00350) (0.00090)
Non-deﬁned 0.10541 0.09409 0.05572* -0.00005
(0.00545) (0.00187) (0.01005) (0.00222)
CONSTANT 0.63682* -0.16867* 0.49383* 0.14992*
(0.01584) (0.00336) (0.01822) (0.00362)
N 103598 2071710 52626 1583334
R-sq 0.5009 0.5823 0.5579 0.6385
Notes: (i) speciﬁcation 3 also includes a set of regional, industry and time dummies;
(ii) robust cluster standard errors in parentheses;
(iii) *, **, *** denotes signiﬁcant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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